University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 2

Article 3

1976

Critique: A Plaintiff 's View
Henry L. Marsh III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry L. Marsh III, Critique: A Plaintiff's View, 10 U. Rich. L. Rev. 315 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

CRITIQUE: A PLAINTIFF'S VIEW
Henry L. Marsh, III*
No greater challenge confronts persons seeking to enjoy America's
promise of "equality and justice for all" than that of enforcing the
clear congressional mandate that all forms of discrimination based
on race, religion, nationality and sex be eliminated. It follows then
that the continued existence of such discrimination constitutes a
great danger to the moral and economic well-being of our nation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1-clearly the most potent
weapon in the struggle for equal employment opportunity-was
born in the civil rights revolution of the sixties and was expanded
in 1972 to cover the public sector. Notwithstanding the broad2 and
pervasive3 coverage of the Act and a decade of litigation, 4 compliance is still the exception rather than the rule. Discrimination in
employment is widespread and such progress as has been made has
been the result of litigation by a small segment of the private bar
and to a lesser extent by the activities of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Several explanations may be offered for the disappointing results
under Title VII to date. In the first place, the resources provided by
Congress were and continue to be insufficient for the task. Since the
early months following the enactment of the statute, additional
funding has been needed to secure a sufficient staff to eliminate the
tremendous backlog of cases pending before the EEOC. Second, the
* B.A., Virginia Union University, 1956; LL.B. Howard University, 1959. Member, Hill,
Tucker and Marsh, Richmond, Virginia. Mr. Marsh served as counsel for plaintiffs in the
early landmark case of Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) and
the recent case of Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 F.E.P. Cases 778 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974).
2. Sections 701(b) and 701(e) extend the sweep of Title VII to all employees and unions in
an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees or members. Id. §§ 2000e-2(b),
-2(e).
3. Section 703(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in hiring and discharging and sections
703(a)(2) and 703(c) prevent employers and unions from limiting, segregating or classifying
employees or applicants in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of
employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. § 2000e4.
4. Much of the early litigation involved procedural problems and technical defenses raised
by companies and unions.
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failure of the EEOC to take more aggressive and forceful action has
contributed immeasurably to the problem; this failure has placed
additional pressure on the private bar to become the major force in
Title VII developments. Third, because of the protracted nature of
Title VII litigation, the contingency of the undertaking and the huge
cash outlay necessary to carry the litigation to a conclusion, only a
small number of attorneys5 have been willing to handle such litigation on behalf of the victims of discrimination. Fourth, many companies, unions, and governmental units have failed to recognize
their exposure to liability under Title VII and/or have been willing
to gamble that they would not be successfully sued. Fifth, only a
minute number of those persons victimized by unlawful discrimination have filed complaints. Many victims do not file because they
are unaware of the discrimination, are afraid of retaliation (either
overt or subtle), or believe that the filing of a complaint would be
an exercise in futility. Finally, the congressional assumption that
voluntary compliance would play a major role in eliminating forbidden discrimination proved to be wrong. The fact is that only slight
progress has resulted from voluntary compliance.
The last several years have produced highly successful litigation
which should result in a more effective enforcement of Title VII. Of
particular importance are cases which expand the back pay awards
for victims of discrimination,' and those which provide for the payment of interim attorneys' fees. 7 The problems in securing effective
enforcement of Title VII, however, are of such magnitude that it will
require outstanding leadership by the EEOC, increased participation by the private bar, additional funding to EEOC by the Congress and effective and imaginative judicial interpretation by the
federal courts. Anything less will not make serious inroads against
the cancer of employment discrimination which has become so
firmly entrenched in the employment policies and practices of the
industries of our nation.
5. Much of the successful litigation to date has been sponsored by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund.
6. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 F.E.P. Cases 778 (E.D. Va. 1974).

